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INTRODUCTION
Innovative capacity is vital to the value of companies and their operations as a perpetual going-concern.
However, innovative capacity is difficult to measure or stock, due to the fact that innovation is a continuous process of strategic objectives, and largescale diffusion is a gradual process. Patents are seen as an appropriate index by which to measure innovative capacity (Hirshleifer et al., 2013; Fang et al., 2014) and the fact that the associated intellectual property rights can be legally enforced means that the patentee reserves exclusive rights to the use or distribution of an invention. Patents play an important role in technological and economic development, and the benefits of patents have been studies extensively (Hsu, 2009; Lerner et al., 2011; Cohen et al., 2013; Hirshleifer et al., 2013) . However, researchers are now turning their attention to the potential risks and costs imposed on capital markets (e.g., litigation costs) in the form of patent litigation (Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2013;
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increase between 2007 and 2011 in the number of lawsuits concerning patent infringement, with the legal costs for just one case increasing from $650,000 to $5 million. Furthermore, many patent infringement lawsuits are related to the prevalence of low quality patents. 2 The cost and time spent on patent litigation can be harmful to innovation and undermine economic vitality. Additionally, rating agencies and auditors both play an important information intermediary in capital markets by providing investors and other related parties with information about the financial health and long-term perspective of companies they rate or audit, and hence their credit ratings and audit opinions should be able to reflect litigation information to market participants and mitigate the problem of asymmetric information. This study sought to reveal the underlying causes and economic consequences of patent litigation through an investigation of innovative capacity, credit ratings, and audit opinions. Our main results and contributions are summarized as follows. First, we found that companies with new invention patents are more likely to file plaintiff-initiated lawsuits and less likely to suffer defendant-related lawsuits. This implies that companies with quality innovative capacity are able to defend their rights and protect themselves. We also found that the type of patent (e.g., invention, utility model, design) is associated with the likelihood of patent-related lawsuits. This study differs from previous work 3 in its examination of whether and how the likelihood of patent litigation is affected by the quality of innovative capacity. An understanding of the causes of patent litigation is of considerable importance to the market, and assessments of the economic consequences could provide useful and timely information to investors. Second, we found that credit rating agencies are more likely to assign unfavorable ratings to companies involved in patent litigation. The expertise and experience of auditors was also shown to affect the risk perceived by raters in cases where auditees are involved in patent-related lawsuits. This is an indication that raters may take into account the engagement-specific expertise of auditors in their rating decisions. This contributes to an understanding of the economic consequences of litigation and determinants of credit rating (Güttler and Wahrenburg, 2007; Jorion et al., 2009; Güntay and Hackbarth, 2010; Afonso et al., 2011) . Our findings also address the debate as to whether credit ratings provide useful information to investors (Crabtree and Maher, 2005; Yi and Mullineaux, 2006; Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009 ; U.S. Department of Justice, 2013) . Third, our results show that auditors are more likely to issue unclean opinions 4 about clients involved in patent litigation. Nonspecialist auditors are more likely to take into account involvement in patent litigation in their assessment of risk, thereby earning the firm an unclean opinion. In contrast, auditors specializing in a particular industry have a deeper 1 NPE is people or company that obtains patents and sues alleged infringers but do not make useful products of their own.
2 GAO (2013) . provides an overview of consequences of litigation and suggests that there is no NPE patent litigation crisis; meanwhile, this report also dedicated a good portion of its report on how the courts' administrative improvements and the implementation of AIA are likely to affect the handling of patent cases and patent quality in the future.
3 Prior accounting studies Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998), Schmidt (2012) , Lisic, L.L., S.D. Silveri, Song and Wang (2015) . mention the litigation are more likely to focus on client's fraud or auditor's legal liability.
understanding of the risk of litigation, and are therefore more likely to base their opinions on the specifics of the case. These results extend our understanding of the relationship between auditor types and auditor opinions (Li, 2009; Chi and Chin, 2011) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we review relevant literature and develop our research hypotheses. The third section discusses the research method. The fourth section describes the sample and reports descriptive statistics. The fifth section presents empirical results. The final section concludes the paper.
RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Causes of Patent Lawsuits
The cost of lawsuits and their effects on investors drives home the need to elucidate the underlying causes of litigation. In the auditing literature, previous studies have focused on identifying the determinants leading to lawsuits and how ex-ante auditor risk of litigation affects auditor behavior. 5 Bonner et al. (1998) identified a correlation between fraud in financial reporting and the likelihood of litigation against auditors. Some studies have shown that the likelihood of litigation against auditors depends on the type of client, stock price volatility, restatements, and financial distress (Shu, 2000; Heninger, 2001; Palmrose and Scholz, 2004) . Other studies have
shown that auditing firms screen for potentially risky clients (Johnstone, 2001; Johnstone and Bedard, 2003; Johnstone and Bedard, 2004; Asare et al., 2005) and adjust auditing fees according to the risk of litigation (Seetharaman et al., 2002) .
In the accounting literature, previous studies have focused on the influence that litigation risk exerts on the behavior of management, such as the relationship between voluntary disclosure and litigation (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Johnson et al., 2001; Field et al., 2005; Graham et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2007) . Researchers have reported that many companies change their disclosure policies after being sued because they gaining a better understanding of the link between disclosure and litigation after going through the litigation process (Kothari et al., 2009; Ball et al., 2012; Billings and Cedergren, 2015) . 6 Some researchers have shown a link between the quality of financial reporting, such as earnings management and restatements, and the risk of litigation (Palmrose and Scholz, 2004; Johnson et al., 2007; Cohen et al., 2008; Bardos et al., 2013) . It has also been suggested that poor stock price performance is associated with a higher risk of litigation (Arena and Julio, 2015) .
Much of the literature pertaining to the causes of litigation disregards the differences between various types of lawsuit and their underlying causes. In this study, we focused on patent-related lawsuits with the aim of elucidating the link between patent litigation and innovative capacity. Patents can be viewed as an indication of innovative capacity and the hidden crisis/defense capability of a patent's dispute. In 2012, the Price Waterhouse Coopers (PwC) pointed out that many factors affect the likelihood of involvement in patent litigation; however, a direct correlation has been established between the number of patents issued and the number of patent-related lawsuits.
Clearly, understanding the relationship between patent-related lawsuits and innovative capacity may provide direct evidence for the causes of patent litigation. We state our first hypothesis as follows:
H1. Innovative capacity is positively associated with patent lawsuits
Economic Consequences of Patent Lawsuits
Patent-related lawsuits can distract companies from the development of novel products, cause them to disregard their product strategy, and impose heavy litigation costs. Patent-related lawsuits also tend to attract public attention and raise questions concerning product integrity, which can have serious economic consequences.
5 See Latham, and Linville (1998) . for detailed discussions about the audit litigation.
Patent-related lawsuits can affect a company's business decisions as well as the valuation of equity on the market.
Besides the companies themselves, capital markets include two types of participants: investors and information intermediaries. Information intermediaries play a critical role in disseminating information, they help mitigate the problems caused by asymmetric information in economic transactions. In capital markets, credit rating agencies and auditors are particularly important certification intermediaries, they contribute to enhance disclosure effectiveness by disclosing the information that is not available to the public but is incorporated in their credit ratings and audit opinions. Credit ratings represent the perceptions of investors (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012; Baghai et al., 2014) including their current observations of company characteristics as well as their expectations with regard to future performance (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004) . Audit opinions reflect the current financial condition of the company and their expectations with regard to its future well-being (Ajona et al., 2008; Herbohn and Ragunathan, 2008 ). An understanding of the perceptions of credit raters and auditors can help to elucidate the economic consequences of patent-related lawsuits. Thus, we focused on the role of credit raters and auditors in our examination of the economic consequences of patent-related lawsuits.
Credit Rater
A number of high-profile bankruptcies among credit raters has undermined the confidence of regulators and investors with regard to the independence, skills, and quality/diligence of credit rating agencies (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2003; Thomas et al., 2011) . The U.S. Congress sought to increase transparency and the integrity of the rating process by passing the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRA Reform Act) of 2006, which includes new recognition standards and more formal oversight of rating agencies. In Taiwan, the Financial Supervisory Commission 7 has clearly indicated that the management of risk by raters should include established procedures for the identification, assessment, monitoring, and reporting of risk. Furthermore, the process of analysis should include industry risk, corporate strategy, business reviews, performance, investment and capitalization, liquidity, and financial flexibility. A number of recent studies have shown that regulatory pressure and public criticism can be helpful in making rating agencies more responsible with regard to credit analysis. Since the Enron episode (Cheng and Neamtiu, 2009; Alp, 2013; Bruno et al., 2016) 8 many of the rating agencies have greatly improved the timeliness, accuracy, and stability of their ratings. As mentioned above, rating agencies are becoming increasingly flexible in their assessment of risk and their subsequent rating decisions. We therefore propose that rating agencies are more likely to assign unfavorable ratings for companies involved in patent litigation when their perceived risk is affected by litigation disclosures.
H2
. Patent lawsuits are positively associated with unfavorable credit ratings.
Auditor
Stanley (2011) claimed that client business risk affects audit risk, such that the judgement of auditors may be more conservative in cases where clients face higher risk of litigation (DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Lu and Sapra, 2009) . Auditors tend to be more responsive to the risk of litigation when it conflicts with incentives to seek profits (Tucker et al., 2003; Blay, 2005) 9 and previous researchers have reported that auditors should consider the risk of litigation in their opinion decisions (Blay, 2005; Cahan and Zhang, 2006; Elder et al., 2009) . A number of 7 For more laws and regulations on the Matters Required to be Included in the Corporate Bylaws of Credit Rating Agencies, see the web site http://law.fsc.gov.tw. 8 In Enron's case, Enron announced its intention to restate its financial statements for 1997 through 2000 and the first and second quarters of 2001 to reduce previously reported net income by an aggregate of $586 million. However, Enron's ratings remained at investment grade until four days before bankruptcy.
9 AU-C Section 570 (SAS No. 126) states that auditors must "evaluate whether there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern". Moreover, auditors' evaluation should identify events or conditions affecting clients' going-concern uncertainty, for example, legal proceedings, legislation, or similar matters that might jeopardize an entity's ability to operate; loss of a key franchise, license, or patent, etc.
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studies have found that since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, auditors have been more likely to issue goingconcern opinions (Fargher and Jiang, 2008; Li, 2009; Feldmann and Read, 2010) which have been shown to reduce the risk of litigation (Mong and Roebuck, 2005) . 10, 11 We thus suppose that auditors are more likely to assign unfavorable audit opinions for companies involved in patent litigation when their perceived risk is affected by litigation disclosures.
H3. Patent lawsuits are positively associated with unfavorable audit opinions.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Causes of Patent Lawsuits
Innovative Capacity
In this study, we sought to reveal the causes of patent-related lawsuits by examining the relationship between the likelihood of patent lawsuit and innovative capacity. In Equation (1), we use three dependent variables as proxies for patent-related lawsuits: LAWSUIT, DEFLAW and PLALAW. LAWSUIT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is involved in patent-related lawsuits; otherwise 0. We further differentiate between defendantrelated and plaintiff-initiated. DEFLAW is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is involved in patent-related lawsuits as a defendant; otherwise 0. PLALAW is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is involved in patentrelated lawsuits as a plaintiff; otherwise 0. We focused on the sign and significance of the coefficients on PAT, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company obtained new patents; otherwise 0. If innovative capacity increases the probability of patent-related lawsuits, then β 1 should be positive. Variables are defined in Table 1 .
(1) INBOD ＝ the number of independent directors on the board divided by the total board size; YEAR ＝ dummy variables controlling for years.
The Content of Innovative Capacity
The Patent Act of Taiwan divides patents into three categories: invention, utility model, and design. 12 The three types of patents represent different levels of innovative capacity, which may differ in their effects on patentrelated lawsuits. In Equation (2), we used three independent variables as proxies for the different types of patent:
PATINV, PATUM and PATDES. PATINV is the natural log of the number of the companies obtaining new patents for inventions; PATUM is the natural log of the number of the companies obtaining new utility patents; and PATDES is the natural log of the number of the companies obtaining new design patents.
The Patent Act of 2014 describes the different among these three types of patents: Invention patents mean the creation of technical ideas, utilizing the laws of nature; utility model patents mean the creation of technical ideas relating to the shape or structure of an article or combination of articles, utilizing the laws of nature;
and design patents mean the creation made in respect of the shape, pattern, color, or any combination thereof, of an article as a whole or in part by visual appeal. We sought to determine the economic consequences of patent-related lawsuits. In accordance with previous studies (Cheng and Subramanyam, 2008; Jiang, 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009; Gul and Goodwin, 2010; DeFond et al., 2011) we adopt the Taiwan Corporate Credit Rating Index (TCRI ratings) as a proxy for economic consequences from the perspective of investors in order to capture credit risk. We expected that patent-related lawsuits would have negative consequences for credit ratings due to the unfavorable implications for the future economic prospects of the company. TCRI divides credit ratings into ten degrees, with the highest value representing the highest credit risk. 13
Audit Opinion
We used audit opinions as a measure of economic consequences from the perspective of auditors, and then investigated whether and how the perspective of auditors is affected by the frequency and number of patent-related lawsuits. In Equation (4), GC is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company receives a unclean opinion; otherwise 0.
NUMLAW is the natural log of number of the companies involved in patent-related lawsuits, and AMOLAW is the natural log of the total amount of damages due to patent infringement.
Control Variable
Following prior research (Chandra, 2011; Bentley et al., 2013; Kaplan and Williams, 2013) we include several variables to capture the underlying condition of the company: ROA is net income divided by total assets. GROWTH is percentage growth in sales; OCF is cash flow from operations divided by total assets; and DE is total debt divided by total assets. We expect companies that are more profitable have less likelihood of litigation, and companies with larger leverage have more likelihood of litigation, unfavorable ratings and opinions. Then we follow previous studies (Cheng and Farber, 2008; Coles et al., 2008) to control for companies' governance environment: CONTROL is number of seat-control directors divided by the total board size; DEVIATION is the stock-control right minus the earnings-distribution right; DUALITY is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the chairman of the board is also the CEO, otherwise 0; and INBOD is the number of independent directors on the board divided by the total board size. We expect that companies whose board seat-control and equity deviation are larger and the CEO duality will be more likely to associate with higher likelihood of litigation, unfavorable ratings and opinions. The board is more independent have less likelihood of litigation. In addition, we also controlled for size and year effects. SIZE is the natural log of total assets and YEAR is dummy variables controlling for years (Chandra, 2011; Bentley et al., 2013) .
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Sample Distribution
The financial performance of firms in the electronics industry is closely tied to innovation. This has led to a large number of patent-related lawsuits, with wide ranging economic consequences. Thus, focusing on the electronics industry can help us addressing our research issues. Our sample selection was guided by the following considerations. First, data concerning the content of lawsuits was hand-collected from annual reports of the Market Observation Post System (MOPS), whereas patent-related data was hand-collected from the Taiwan Patent Search System (TPSS). For this reason, we tried to keep the sample size manageable. Furthermore, we focused on patentrelated lawsuits in the electronics industry, due to the vigor with which innovation is pursued in this field. Based on the above criteria, our sample comprised 4,851 firm-year observations of the electronics firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) over the period from 2010 to 2015. Company-level accounting and corporate governance data were obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database. greater innovative capacity is associated with a lower probability of being involved in patent-related lawsuits. Panel C lists the distribution of lawsuit observations by credit rating, which shows that companies involved in patent lawsuits have the highest percentages (43.08%) in the medium risk rating. Panel D shows that approximately 56.73% of the lawsuit observations involved unclean opinions, which implies that the auditors may be taking into account the risk of damages associated with possible patent infringement. The clients of auditing firms that do not specialize in the industry were more likely to receive unfavorable opinions than were the clients of industry specialists. Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the dependent and independent variables, the results of which are consistent with Table 3 . Most of the explanatory variables are not significantly correlated with each other. Only the correlations between ROA and OCF (0.5940), and ROA and GROWTH (0.3898) are greater than 0.30. We further computed variance inflation factors (VIF) for all models, wherein the largest was only 1.57, which is well below the 10 threshold of concern recommended by Kennedy (1998) and Gujarati (1995) . Thus, our empirical results were shown to be unaffected by multicollinearity. 
Descriptive Statistics
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report and discuss the empirical results. We also include year fixed effects in research models and adopt clustering by companies plus White's heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (Petersen, 2009; Gow et al., 2010; Boone et al., 2013) .
Causes of Patent Lawsuits
Innovative Capacity
Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results of the research models described in Equ ation (1), us in g LAW S UIT as the d epend en t va riable. As s hown in c olumn 1, the coefficient on the test variable PAT was 0.6313, which is significant at the 1% level (z = 10.03). This result is consistent with H1, suggesting that companies with greater innovation output are more likely to be involved in patent-related lawsuits. This finding is consistent with the PWC (2012). Focusing on the sample of patent-related lawsuits, we then considered defendant-related and plaintiff-initiated lawsuits to test H1, based on the fact that it does not matter whether plaintiffs or defendants are influenced by patent litigation. The coefficient of PAT in column 2 is insignificant and negative, whereas the coefficient of PAT in column 3 is significant and positive. These empirical results imply that companies with greater innovative capacity are more likely to defend their patent rights by filing a lawsuit for patent infringement. All of the estimated coefficients on the control variables SIZE, GROWTH, OCF, DUALITY, and INBOD are significant, with the expected signs. To identify which levels of innovation are more likely to drive patent-related lawsuits, we considered various innovation outputs in Equation (2), the results of which are presented in Table 6 . In Panel A, the coefficient of PATINV is significant and positive, whereas the coefficients of PATUM and PATDES are insignificant but positive.
In Panel B, the coefficient of PATINV is significant and negative, the coefficient of PATUM is significant and positive, and the coefficient of PATDES is insignificant and positive. b Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others. c The number reported in TABLE 6 is different from other TABLEs because some companies obtained new patents more than one type of patents in the same year. In addition, some companies involved in patent-related lawsuit more than one case in the same year. Thus, these companies may be both plaintiffs and defendants. d This TABLE adopts clustering by company and white adjustments.
In Panel C, the coefficient of PATINV is significant and positive, the coefficient of PATUM is significant and negative, and the coefficient PATDES is insignificant and positive. These empirical results indicate that companies are more (less) likely to file plaintiff-initiated lawsuits when they obtain new invention (utility) patents, and companies are less (more) likely to suffer defendant-related lawsuits when they obtain new invention (utility) patents. These results imply that companies that are more involved in innovative activities are more likely to have to defend their patent rights and fight off defendant-related lawsuits. Furthermore, utility patents are inherently unstable and uncertain, due to the fact that Taiwan uses a non-substantive examination system for utility patents.
As a result, companies with new utility patents are likely to face defendant-related lawsuits and unlikely to file plaintiff-initiated lawsuits. Table 7 presents the results obtained when Equation (3) was used to investigate whether patent-related lawsuits increase credit risk leading to unfavorable ratings. Panel A shows that the coefficient of LAWSUIT is significant and positive at the 1% level (z = 2.45). This result is consistent with H2, suggesting that credit rating agencies are more likely to assign unfavorable ratings to companies with patent-related lawsuits. Auditors play an important role in validating financial information being released to capital markets, as well as in providing nonfinancial information to clients. Specifically, auditors can provide industry-related information as long as they possess engagement-specific expertise. Previous researchers have demonstrated that industry specialization is associated with higher quality financial reporting (Gul et al., 2009; Burnett et al., 2012; Hegazy et al., 2015) which tends to reduce uncertainty among debt market participants, thereby affecting rating decisions (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Alissa et al., 2013) . Ferguson and Pündrich (2015) recently reported that assurance from industry specialists with regard to non-financial information is of considerable importance to investors. This raises the question as to whether the expertise and experience of auditors can alleviate the risk perceived by raters in cases where auditees are involved in patent-related lawsuits. Thus, we further partitioned the sample into groups in which the auditors were with and without expertise in the industry. We found that LAWSUIT is significant and positive (p < 0.01) only in the group without industry expertise, which implies that credit raters may consider whether such companies are audited by industry specialists in the assignment of ratings. When defendant-related and plaintiff-initiated lawsuits were taken into account to test H2, the results in Panel B were very similar to those listed in Panel A; however, none of the results of LAWSUIT in Panel C were significant. These findings suggest that credit raters may regard defendant-initiated lawsuits as a violation of patent rights, leading them to assign unfavorable ratings. Further, these findings suggest that raters incorporate the effects of industry expertise in their rating decisions. b Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others.
Economic Consequences of Patent Lawsuits
Credit Rating
c The number reported in TABLE 7 is different from other TABLEs because some companies obtained new patents more than one type of patents in the same year. In addition, some companies involved in patent-related lawsuit more than one case in the same year. Thus, these companies may be both plaintiffs and defendants. Panel A shows that the coefficient LAWSUIT is significant and positive at the 1% level (z = 2.57), indicating that companies with patent-related lawsuits are more likely to receive unclean opinions. We also considered the influence of industry specialists in determining whether the expertise and experience of auditors affects their opinion decisions in cases where auditees are involved in patent-related lawsuits. After partitioning the sample into groups in which auditors are with and without industry expertise, we found that LAWSUIT is only significant and positive (p < 0.01) in the non-industry expert group, which implies that auditors without industry expertise are more likely to view patent-related lawsuits as indicators of risk. Notably, the coefficient of LAWSUIT is insignificant and positive in the industry expertise group, which implies that industry experts may have a deeper understanding of the true nature of litigation in innovation-rich industries, such that their reactions do not present obvious patterns. Panel B shows that the coefficient NUMLAW in both subsamples is significant and positive, which implies that auditors are more concerned about the frequency of patent-related lawsuits, regardless of whether the company is audited by industry experts or non-experts. Panel C shows that the coefficient AMOLAW in the non-industry expertise group is significant and positive, which implies that non-industry experts are more likely than industry experts to be concerned by the dollar amount associated with patent-related lawsuits. b Asterisks *, **, *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. One-tailed for directional expectations, two-tailed for others.
Audit Opinion
c The number reported in Panel C is different because some companies provide only qualitative information of patent lawsuit.
d This TABLE adopts clustering by company and white adjustments.
Sensitivity Analyses (Not Tabulated) 16
To test the robustness of our results, we conducted three sensitivity tests. First, to ensure that the study results were not sensitive to rating measure, we replaced the continuous rating measure presented here with a measure that collapses the TCRI ratings into four categories: 1 to 4, 5 to 6, 7 to 9, and 10 and reran the research models. Second, as an alternative measure of auditor industry expertise, we adopted the approach proposed by Francis et al. (2005) wherein auditors are classified as experts only in cases where the firm is a market leader, based on their market share using the total assets audited by an auditing firm within a given industry. Third, auditor changes and restatements may also affect the perspective of market participants and thereby bias empirical analysis.
Thus, we excluded observations related to auditor changes and restatements. The above sensitivity tests demonstrate the general robustness of our main findings.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examined the causes and economic consequences of patent-related lawsuits. Our empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, companies with greater innovative capacity are more likely to be involved in defending their patent rights and/or filing plaintiff-initiated lawsuits for the infringement of a patent. This finding is consistent with the GAO (2013) in which low-quality patents are associated with a higher number of patent infringement suits and tend to hinder innovation. Second, credit rating agencies are more likely to assign unfavorable ratings to companies with patent-related lawsuits, and raters appear to consider the effects of industry expertise in their rating decisions. Third, companies with patent-related lawsuits are more likely to receive unclean opinions, and auditors lacking industry expertise are more likely than experts to be concerned by the frequency of patent-related lawsuits and/or the dollar values involved.
This study faced several limitations, some of which may necessitate future research. First, this study focuses only on patent-related lawsuits in the electronics industry; therefore, our results are not necessarily representative of all companies involved in patent litigation. Second, we acted in accordance with previous studies (AshbaughSkaife et al., 2006; Cheng and Subramanyam, 2008; Jiang, 2008; Gul and Goodwin, 2010; DeFond et al., 2011) in the adoption of credit ratings as a proxy to capture unobservable credit risk and examine the consequences of patent litigation. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that our proxies failed to capture credit risk associated with patent litigation, due to the fact that the true credit risk of patent litigation is unobservable. Third, most companies did not disclose the content of patent litigation, which greatly limited the availability of empirical evidence related to the response of auditors to the occurrence of patent litigation and/or the dollar values involved.
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